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Abstract 
The performance of weak democratic governments provides the conditions 
for business elites or political parties to isolate or focus public goods on so-
ciety. The relationship between the State and society is nourished by positive 
freedoms and dignifies them, however, a government is required that amal-
gamates the objectives of the State, public services to the needs of the popula-
tion, social capital, and limits negative freedoms. The objective of this article 
is to analyze the problems of governments in their national and local spheres, 
to consolidate their democracy through electoral or political channels and 
then to ensure a required capacity to satisfy the provision of services—formal 
arrangements—to demonstrate a efficiency, capacity and coherence to govern 
with mechanisms that demonstrate decisional capacity that consolidates 
democratic life. 
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1. Introduction 
In an influential book published in 2020, Darren Acemoglu and James Robinson 
highlight the freedom that is generated in the relationship between the State and 
society. The narrow corridor. States, societies and how to achieve freedom, high-
lights the need for the State and laws, but even more so for the checks and bal-
ances imposed by the presence of a strong society. Today, the necessary institu-
tionalization of evaluation calls for innovation in some facets of human life, 
which is expanding considerably or is becoming a constant rule of governments, 
which are faced with the need to adapt their structures to new conditions, de-
mands and opportunities (Franch Parella, 2020; Bielsa Callau, 2020). 
This issue acquires particular importance due to the constant changes that 
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occur in today’s society and its effects on organizations whose own turbulence 
leads to complexity. This has become a significant category for analyzing the re-
lationships between an organization and the outside world: the organization of 
the government and its institutions are also affected by it. 
Change and conflict have become common in many nations, including 
non-Western ones. In the current period of history, characterized by a constant 
process of democratization, the government and its institutions constitute a 
constant and dominant factor in national and international society. As a conse-
quence, government participation and bureaucratic structure have been a crucial 
factor in controlling this turbulence and a fundamental determinant of govern-
ment legitimacy. This participation also means that institutions must readjust to 
changing conditions, demands and opportunities, which vary dramatically from 
one country to another and which depend on the prevailing social and political 
systems and the level of national development. 
Governance as coherence and political flexibility requires several moments. It 
demands institutional legitimacy and political and administrative efficiency. The 
exercise of the domination of political power is subject to the citizens’ assess-
ment of their institutions, their members and their results. Institutional, political 
and administrative satisfaction or dissatisfaction can be transferred to the evalu-
ation of democratic life. 
In this document, we make the assumption that the norms, rules, products 
and values of government actions do not have a clear legal or institutional 
source, and their institutional legitimacy is at the expense of political and ad-
ministrative efficiency, since rationality and legitimacy are not founded on in-
stituting circumstances, but instituted and imposed by changing organizations. 
It is concluded by panting that the presence of a strong State and clear laws is 
essential, however, freedom and legitimacy do not come from these, and its ori-
gin is found in the checks and balances raised by society. Freedom, legality and 
legitimacy require that there be a society that participates in politics, that is con-
stituted in the balance of the power of the State. 
2. Systems and Institutions in Public Administration 
Freedom and legitimation are the result of the relationship between the State and 
society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2020). It has been reviewed by at least two dif-
ferent theoretical approaches, systems theory and institutionalism. The rela-
tionship between the institutions that the state creates from the bottom up and 
the legal traditions that are expressed in free and participatory societies create 
and recreate freedom and legitimacy. According to Acemoglu & Robinson (2020), 
freedom is the ability to order actions and dispose of your person and belong-
ings. While legitimacy is the result of the acceptance of checks and balances by a 
society involved in politics. 
In systems theory, the administrative system, which functions within the po-
litical system, is represented by the conjunction of bureaucratic agencies, secre-
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taries, parastatal entities and other centralized or decentralized government 
agencies, as well as their internal and external processes. Like the political sys-
tem, the administrative system is in turn made up of various subsystems. Kast & 
Rosenzweig (1977) use the term administrative system when referring to these 
subsystems, that is, the combination of the administrative unit and all the ele-
ments and procedures that interact with the unit. The activity of any part of an 
organization affects the activity of any other. The theoretical scheme that I con-
sider an organization as a system, is the input and output model, it states that the 
government nurtures its legitimacy of inputs or demands, and its internal con-
version into results or responses. The systems model has also been used to study 
the totality of political-administrative structures and procedures. David Easton 
(2012) is the pioneer in developing a framework for a theory of the political sys-
tem, while Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1972) developed a schema for 
political systems, particularly considering comparative studies in politics. 
In various functions of the conversion process, government plays a central 
role: its subsystems are included in these functions to varying degrees. Internal 
inputs are important aspects of the process. Exits are carried out through con-
version processes: these can be bills submitted for consideration by Congress or 
Parliament, executive decisions, rules and regulations, government programs, 
mechanisms and regulations for the control and management of social forces for 
maintenance of the security and public order services. For these cases a distinc-
tion must be made between formal and real departures. The former include 
formal decisions, the latter the effects these decisions have on reality. The out-
puts of the government subsystems are similar to those mentioned previously, 
but they also include proposals and services to other parts of the structure: cabi-
net proposals, decisions of the State executive or decisions of specialists in gov-
ernment processes (Easton, 1996). 
It has been suggested that the demands made by the environment—whether 
explicit or implicit—as well as the procedures and interactions with the govern-
ment structure, can create tensions that give rise to a demand and to the modifi-
cation of structures and processes. This also applies to the subsystems of the 
structure. The outputs that are directed towards the reorganization of structures 
and processes become a response—or laziness—of various parts or units of the 
governmental structure and of the individuals incorporated into the organiza-
tion. 
Two main factors, in the system-environment relationship, codetermine the 
effects of the environment on government organizational structures and processes: 
the degree of openness of the government structure and the type of environ-
ment. Regarding the first element, it allows us to observe to what extent the 
spontaneous or induced change of government structures and processes are 
caused or influenced by the environment. This is decisive to the extent that 
members or groups immersed in the governmental structure, look for and detect 
signs of the environment that are relevant to the governmental structure itself. 
When considering the aspects that open up in government organizations and 
J. Espejel-Mena 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2021.111005 57 Open Journal of Political Science 
 
institutions, an issue that has traditionally been considered a fundamental 
weakness of political bureaucracies is revealed, especially due to their lack of in-
terest in the needs of the political community. This type of relationship between 
society and government causes significant inertia to characterize when govern-
ment structures are closed or open. 
Some factors that make explicit the openness of governments towards social 
demands are the following. First, it depends on how the upper echelons of the 
bureaucracy are made up, what values prevail within the political community, 
and how plural the political decision-making class is. Second, the regulatory 
framework for decision-making, the skills and competencies of those responsible 
for designing efficient policies, and a correlation between the demands of civil 
society and the organizational change of the administrative structure. Third, the 
relationship between political authorities and administrative structures, espe-
cially since the relationship is not always symmetrical since sometimes the same 
agent fulfills both roles (Morlino, 1985). 
Regarding the second element, the type of environment drives organizational 
change by virtue of the fact that it is induced from outside the system. Under 
this logic, organizations that survive the pressures of the environment are due to 
the quality and quantity of their resources. In contrast, organizations whose au-
tonomy from the system is relative are less susceptible to external conditions, as 
well as opportunities for change. This can also apply to government subsystems. 
If they are relatively independent, they may be less affected by external influ-
ences, which does not necessarily limit their ability to change. If the governmen-
tal structure, in a broad sense, tends to be static and conservative, the degree of 
autonomy of a subsystem can favorably affect its relative capacity for change 
(Rustow, 1992). 
The degree of induced external change is also determined by the nature of the 
environment. Various efforts have been made to classify organizational envi-
ronments (Mintzberg, 2002), in a particular way we highlight the importance of 
those media that contain common elements and are not mutually exclusive. So 
far, we can say that the explanation of political and administrative efficiency 
formulated by the systems approach was based on a causal and formal relation-
ship. The exercise of the proper domination of political power requires more 
than facts, efficiency is also the result of feelings and wishes of citizens. In short, 
the need for a substantive strategy for planning and executing political and ad-
ministrative efficiency within and outside the government structure is pertinent. 
Improvised and incoherent changes and reforms can solve urgent and tempo-
rary needs, but they represent vulnerable responses to the fundamental weakness 
of the system and disregard the systematic properties of the governmental 
structure. 
From the perspective of the new institutionalism, the historical institutional-
ists were influenced by the structural-functionalists when they understood poli-
tics as a system of interacting parts, but they rejected the tendency to observe the 
social or cultural forms of individuals as the parameters that manipulate the sys-
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tem operation. They understand the institutional organization of politics as the 
main factor that outlines collective behavior and generates definitive responses. 
Thus, there is a struggle for an implicit structuralism in government institutions, 
instead of functionalism supported by old proposals that observe political results 
as responses to the needs of the system. This type of neo-institutionalists accepts 
the argument that the conflict between cliques, produced by the scarcity of re-
sources, centers on politics; but at the same time, it seeks inquiries to distinguish 
the political results and the inequalities that the results indicate (Powell & Di-
maggio, 1991). 
This school found such explanations in the way in which conflicts are ex-
changed between the structures of political and economic organizations, by pri-
vileging certain interests and neglecting others. These new institutionalists at-
tach high significance to formal political institutions, as well as to the develop-
ment of broader concepts of how and what institutions they transcend. Most of 
the neo-institutionalists of this current understand institutions as formal or in-
formal procedures, routines, norms and practices inserted in the organizational 
structure of politics. For them, institutions oscillate between the rules of a con-
stitutional order or the average operating processes of a bureaucracy and the 
agreements that predominate in the behavior between formal associations (Hall 
& Taylor, 1999). 
There are four characteristics that distinguish this school. On the one hand, 
they tend to conceptualize the relationships between institutions and individual 
behavior in broad segments; second, they emphasize the asymmetries of power 
related to the operation and development of institutions; third, they lean toward 
an institutional development perspective characterized by dependency; finally, 
they are concerned with integrating institutional analysis with the contribution 
of other factors that can be revealed in political results. Regarding the perception 
of how institutions impact the fulfillment of individuals, as a central issue in any 
neo-institutional analysis, two proposals are presented: the calculation approach 
and the cultural approach. Both show differences in how actors behave, what in-
stitutions do, and why institutions persist over time. 
According to this approach, institutions affect, above all, behavior, since the 
actors give a greater or lesser degree of certainty to the organizations, since they 
provide relevant information for the fulfillment of mechanisms for the agree-
ments and also for the organizations penalties. The central point refers to the 
fact that institutions impact individual action by modifying the expectations that 
an actor has about the courses of action that others adopt for this reason, stra-
tegic interaction plays an important role in the analysis (Peters, 2003). The cul-
tural approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the degree to which behavior is 
not a completely strategic matter, but it is part of a more global and universal vi-
sion of the individual. This school, without denying that human behavior is ra-
tional or has a purpose, looks at how far individuals change established routines 
or behavior patterns to achieve their goals. The approach tends to view individ-
uals as satisfiers, rather than utility maximizers, in addition to pointing out to 
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what degree the choice of a course of action depends on the interpretation of a 
situation, rather than a pure instrumental calculation. 
Historical neoinstitutionalists are eclectic in the sense that they accommodate 
other approaches in order to specify the relationship between institution and ac-
tion. For this reason, it is explained that institutions are resistant to institutional 
redesign, since they structure their own choices about the reform that the indi-
vidual intends to promote. A second characteristic of the analysis in historical 
institutionalism refers to the preponderant role granted to power and its rela-
tions; Hence, all neo-institutionalist studies have a central treatment on this is-
sue, above all, in the way in which institutions distribute power among social 
groups. Therefore, instead of considering predetermined scenarios for recruiting 
individuals, historical institutionalists are prone to assume that there is a world 
in which organizations give incentives to groups for their access to the deci-
sion-making process (Powell & Dimaggio, 1991). 
This current, on the other hand, is related to a perspective of historical devel-
opment based on the concept of social chance, in the sense that it ignores the 
principle that operative forces generate similar results in organizational sources. 
Rather, they favor the perspective that the effect of those forces will be measured 
by contextual signs of a specific, naturally institutional situation. For this reason, 
organizations are taken as relatively persistent elements of the historical pano-
rama and as one of the central factors that lead to historical development 
through a set of incremental routes, in periods of continuity, but punctuated by 
critical junctures when an institutional change takes place. Historical institutio-
nalists pay significant attention to the role of institutions in political life, seldom 
insisting that organizations are the only causal force in politics. They aim to 
center organizations on a causal chain that incorporates a relative role to other 
factors, especially in terms of political development and the diffusion of ideas. At 
the core, these institutionalists take for granted that the world is more complex 
than the world of preferences and institutions, often postulated by rational 
choice institutionalists. 
The citizen, by rejecting the institutions that exercise power over him, is re-
jecting his public administration that provides services, however, the citizen, by 
evaluating the provision of public services better and better, does not necessarily 
validate their public institutions. The performance of a government must be in-
creasing, this improvement of services is a necessary condition for citizens to 
value public institutions positively, but it is not enough, since the true origin of 
the governance problem is of a political and political nature, not administrative 
efficiency. This refers us to the consent of the domination exercised by political 
power over the citizen, through a democratic political process to elect the gov-
ernment and subsequently demonstrate a capacity to govern. 
3. Political Efficiency 
Change and transformation are inseparable from the nature of the individual. 
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The political, social, economic and cultural contexts with which the classical 
public administration was born in the Welfare State are no longer the same. To-
day, political and administrative efficiency and effectiveness, as sources of gen-
eration and regeneration of the State, are key elements in the way of carrying out 
the new public management. Despite constant changes, public administration 
persists with other principles and other ways of operating, but the need for a 
source of legitimacy and its governing process remains intact (Arenilla, 2010). 
At first, the structural elements of government organizations were relevant, 
political and administrative efficiency was based on legal efficiency, public ad-
ministration largely fulfilled its functions of social linkage and articulation, 
through the attention of the old and new social problems with minimal taxes 
and strong social policy. Changes in the structure and power, as a result of the 
functions attributed to the public administration, were legalized or formalized. 
Procedures were established with the aim of regulating and formalizing legal 
structures and instruments, to protect citizens and institutions from violations 
or abuses of power (Blanco & Gomà, 2002). At the time, the political and ad-
ministrative efficiency of the Welfare State was not enough to be limited to the 
spheres of action and behavior that it explicitly included in the formal institu-
tional framework. A good part of public administration, in fact, concerns activi-
ties that often escape the various traditional approaches of administrative or le-
gal sciences. It began to be assumed that capacities and actions are usually 
present in every government to resolve countless conflicts of interest that arise 
within the sphere of the political system. The causes of the crisis of the old Wel-
fare State gained consensus, to which the financial crises, the oil crisis and the 
harsh budget programs of the 1970s contributed (Arenilla, 2011). 
4. Administrative Efficiency 
Administrative efficiency, in the version of the new public management, has as a 
source of legitimacy public recognition, rather than formal adherence or the 
constitutional scheme. Citizen support for a State, to a large extent, is the result 
of efficient and effective performance, when inequality and poverty are reduced, 
the democratic State and citizens are strengthened through the provision of ser-
vices, laws, actions and it is complemented when the public observes that the 
performance of decisions is fair, that is, when public management creates value 
(Barzelay, 2003). The current of the new public management, puts the center of 
attention of the administrative efficiency in the achievement of results or in the 
better management of public affairs. The new public management, the search for 
quality, governability or compliance with codes of ethics feed reflection on pub-
lic institutions with the aim that they enjoy greater legitimacy and acceptance by 
citizens. 
The basis of the new public management is the efficiency of results. The legi-
timacy is specified with the evaluation of public management. Citizen priorities 
determine government actions, compliance with these is measured periodically, 
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the competitiveness shown by the public apparatus is necessary to achieve citi-
zen satisfaction. The citizen-client binomial is the one that validates the gov-
ernment’s actions. The public administration is the manager of the contradic-
tions that occur within it. Measurement of results and citizen satisfaction are 
substituted for legal-rational efficiency (Baena, 2010). 
Political efficiency is understood as the aptitude, competence or potential of a 
government to set guidelines that lead to objectives considered valid by a society 
at a given time. In turn, the administrative capacity, considered as a particular 
case or a logical derivation of the first; it could be viewed as the institutional and 
operational potential that enables the implementation of the socially accepted 
and legally established objectives in the political constitution of the State in 
question. 
To a large extent the authority of any institution, as Max Weber (2019) has 
argued so persuasively, is ultimately based on the popular belief of legitimacy. 
Therefore, the considerable and persistent challenges to the legitimacy of gov-
ernment institutions should be viewed with concern, as they threaten to under-
mine government capacity. In this sense, the legitimation of a democratic state is 
based on its political constitution and the political process by which political 
power and its ruling class are renewed. 
The distinctive quality of the modern state is that it depends on the adminis-
trative process as the main instrument for shaping national policy. However, 
conditions may arise that create and explain the establishment of agencies or 
organizations to compensate for institutional deficiencies in the formulation and 
administration of national policy itself. The fact that the management process 
acquires a certain autonomy generates the risk of depersonalizing the political 
responsibility that the rulers acquire, after a democratic political process. 
Institutions, systems and structures develop their trajectory in the sphere of 
the powers of the State and the spheres of government. Those are elements that 
can be defined as the formal power structure. In turn, the political parties and 
interest groups that define the pluralist society gravitate over these jurisdictions. 
These elements form the layer of informal power that conditions the provision 
of inputs and the obtaining of public products. Institutions, systems and struc-
tures then appear to be governed by superstructures of pyramidal power, some-
times formal and precise and other times informal and diffuse. The intelligent 
agents of the organization manage the cells or subunits of public action; their 
decision-making is influenced, with greater or lesser notoriety, by the directives 
of the secretaries, ministers or directors of the systems; the subunits are influ-
enced by the orientations of the parties to which they belong, the pressure of 
groups and public opinion, religious organizations or the military. 
The separation of powers remains open to theoretical controversy as a conse-
quence of constitutional practices (Günther & Cancio, 2003). At first it represented 
a balance between political efficiency and administrative efficiency: public action 
was ultimately subject to the approval, interpellation or censure of the repre-
sentatives of the people. However, since the emergence of political parties, the 
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balance was threatened. In presidential regimes, the president tries to create an 
image of independence from his party rank, although this is sometimes not po-
litically feasible. For their part, ministers and legislators do not disdain that line 
that keeps them intertwined with their party when making decisions (Linz, 
1997). 
In such circumstances, it makes no sense to speak of power through consen-
sus versus power through administration; administers the political party or coa-
lition in power and censors those who remained in the opposition. If the same 
executive party dominates the Congress, the latter does not control the former; if 
the political party that made up the Executive is a minority in Congress, it may 
prevent it from managing with ease. This is the everyday history of the so-called 
division of powers, in contemporary constitutionally governed countries. The 
fact that these countries are the least studied in the political science literature 
does not hide the reality that they are the most numerous on a world scale (Linz, 
1996). 
The political process is involved with the administrative process. It is difficult 
to conceive, even in socio-political systems with marked structural differentia-
tion, the total separation of functions that the existence of a strictly instrumental 
public administration would imply. All administrative behavior carries with it 
some political implications, and the fact that pressure groups seeking power act 
in close proximity to the decision-making levels of the public administration 
cannot be ignored. Moreover, it can be affirmed that the struggles that are un-
leashed within the public administration have become a main form of political 
action. 
In various Western nations, the thesis that the State administration is modern, 
being organized by Max Weber’s rational-legal model, still persists. The detail of 
this appreciation is the correlation of a modern public administration with an 
industrialized and politically pluralistic society (Weber, 2019). However, the 
rapid economic transformation aimed at industrialization does not require as a 
condition the adjustment of administrative structures to the norms derived from 
the Neo-Weberian model. Politically, Samuel Huntington (2016) argues that an 
autocratic system has greater possibilities of promoting deep economic trans-
formations in the short term than one based on political competition (Deutsch, 
1998). 
A constant practice in countries in the process of political change is the ten-
dency of political elites to centralize the administrative process, using the ad-
ministration as an instrument to exercise control over local governments. In ef-
fect, contemporary regimes—with instability in their political processes, as well 
as unstable in their economy—have had to promote socioeconomic transforma-
tions through tight control of the administrative process, that is, direct deci-
sion-making efficiency and its public value (Huntington, 2016). In general, for 
the structures of a government in transition, the value of the centralization of the 
political and administrative process is always greater than the autonomy and 
search for consolidation of their efficiency (Nolte, 1991). 
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The thesis that considers the public function as a source of political will, both 
of the representative and the administrator, is classic. The argument for such an 
assertion lies in the multiple condition of the individual vis-à-vis politics and 
public administration, that is, as an integral part of the source of political effi-
ciency or as part of administrative efficiency. When Vervigratia performs bu-
reaucratic tasks, it fulfills part of an administrative process and when it exercises 
a right or fulfills an obligation of a political nature, it coincides or disagrees with 
the group in power, which it serves. 
Ultimately, formal institutions appear as the affordable instrument with which 
modern states democratically legitimize their daily social work. Institutional le-
gitimacy is an indispensable condition for institutional effectiveness by endow-
ing them with an inherent capacity to impose obedience and respect. Legitimacy 
allows an institution to achieve its goals without the regular need to threaten the 
use of force and to create renewed episodes of public resentment. One assump-
tion is that a State, especially one that is born from a violent change, revolution 
or political transition, consolidates its socio-historical legitimacy to the extent 
that it translates into realities the objectives that it includes in its ideological 
platform, and these are established as means to resolve the popular demands that 
gave rise to it. This set of objectives in turn implies the designation of instru-
ments of action or agents of change of a political, economic, social and adminis-
trative nature, which must be oriented to the operational translation of the goals 
that constitute the nation’s project; which is generally collected by the constitu-
tion or formal institutions of each country. 
5. Some Performance Findings on Government Stocks 
The actions that the government produces are not actions that are the product of 
linear, incremental, total or limited rationality; on the contrary, they are the re-
sult of a constant negotiation process between public and private actors, who 
exchange resources and information in order to influence their political and ad-
ministrative results. 
Administrative systems, bureaucratic apparatuses, public managers, the career 
civil service or the government, are state apparatuses that seek to create and 
recreate its legitimacy. Efficiency, legitimation, legality, functionality and ad-
ministrative rationalization are some trends that will have to be achieved with 
the proper action of the State and its predominance in political activity. The legi-
timacy of the changes in the administrative structure of the State is granted by 
the rapid social changes that occur, and not in the legality that they serve. 
The mutations of the community-State, the integration of economic blocs, the 
increase in economic inequality, cultural segregation, the multiculturalism of so-
ciety, constitute realities that demand the revaluation of the State that we know. 
The paradigm of rational choice (Buchanan & Tullock, 1993), the postulates of 
the theory of the minimal State (Nozick, 1990) and the new institutionalism 
(March & Olsen, 1997) have the political pretension of revaluing the State in an 
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uncertain world. The thesis of Georg Sorensen (2011) is that turbulent times are 
lived as a result of the conclusion of the Cold War and the entry into a contin-
gent context in which the State is witness to unprecedented realities: terrorism, 
struggle of identities, globalization, regionalization, governance, social networks, 
policy networks, responsibility, transparency and accountability, good govern-
ment, new sovereignty, withdrawal of the State, economic and political integra-
tion, post-national State, democratic governance, liberalization, democratization. 
In this context, the State administration is also adapting to new axes: 1) demo-
cratization of the administration; 2) main agent relationship; 3) network vision, 
4) management and responsibility; and 5) implementation of public capacities 
(Uvalle, 2009). 
The encounter between the stable and continuous that characterizes modern-
ity, and the discontinuous and complex that frames postmodernity, have con-
fronted their emblematic historical reality: the modern State. The encounter be-
tween order and chaos is contradictory for the State, there is no perfect order or 
perfect disorder, the product of the union between two or more components is 
the complexity that the State faces. Faced with these events, it is pertinent to 
continue asking ourselves: How to deal with the constant changes that occur in 
the sources of political and administrative legitimacy of the government today? 
In this regard, Charles Tilly (2010: p. 20) states that “the quality of public pol-
icy in one regime or another depends significantly on the relationships between 
the basic trust networks of the people and the government strategies of the ru-
lers”. Trust—like trust networks—is inherent to the legitimacy of government 
actions or policies. Thus, public policies are the product of the consensus be-
tween rulers, government agents, governments, political actors and the regime. 
Policies always underlie a claim to efficiency in solving problems. However, 
for policies to generate confidence in the public sphere, it is unavoidable for the 
rulers or elected authorities to be known; it is essential that government agents 
and political actors speak on behalf of the government; and a leading role for 
non-governmental entities is crucial. In this sense, in order to create a network 
of trust in the results of the State’s work, the condition is that all the agents in-
volved in the policies work collaboratively. Tilly (2010) himself, following Adam 
Smith, suggests that networks of trust in “commercial countries” work by kin-
ship, however, networks based only on kinship as civilization advances, they wea-
ken and give step to more complex relationships, such as politically active asso-
ciations or the incorporation and career of network members in public adminis-
tration. Participants in these networks obtain personal benefits and protection 
against possible eventualities, aids that they will not be able to acquire elsewhere. 
The assumptions of rational choice, game theory or economic neo-institutionalism 
are present in Charles Tilly’s analyzes, since networks, on the one hand, are the 
result of individual calculations on costs and benefits, of the relationships be-
tween agents and principals or the decrease in transaction costs. 
The review of the trust networks that Tilly proposes goes further: it allows us 
to distinguish between government actions—actions of government agents and 
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social actions—actions of political actors. The former are actions of the govern-
ment towards society, while the latter go from society to the government. Both 
actions, separately, cause suspicion or lack of trust. Society’s trust networks, by 
polarizing, only express and amalgamate certain links, cause suspicion to the rest 
of society, and can form a collective action that forms a social movement. 
The connections between public policy and trust networks vary. At one ex-
treme, trust networks operate within the government because they are regular 
units that the government apparatus itself leads and determines. On the other 
hand, trust networks operate outside the government, out of the government’s 
sight, without surveillance controls. These networks change their position to 
move towards or away from public policy, when the trusted network lives under 
the protection of an intermediary, relatively autonomous, it can move away from 
the tuning of the government, on the contrary when the trusted network con-
nects with the government can help satisfy the demands made on the political 
authorities. 
Charles Tilly (2010: p. 52), suggests the review of trust networks, from a form 
of combined structuralism, that is, structures not only understand and repro-
duce themselves, they are also the product of exchange interactions between in-
dividuals and their “... approach reverses the causal direction, treating attitudes 
not as causes, but as effects of social interaction.” A clear example of this is that 
trust can influence democratization, as well as distrust in de-democratization. 
Political regimes and trust networks face common problems. They face organi-
zational difficulties in their internal functioning, which are reflected in their 
preservation and in the relationship between one and the other. Both depend on 
structures that provide them with new resources for their continuity, that pro-
duce and reproduce their main activities. 
According to the structure of the organizations, these can work at least under 
three schemes: 1) in an authoritarian way; 2) cooperatively and 3) through 
trusted networks. For Tilly in trust networks, long-term risk is valued differently 
and the conditions of human beings are recovered, that is, trust networks store, 
produce and capitalize on the experiences of the network. Individual or group 
participation in the construction of network infrastructure contributes to the 
creation and recreation of social capital. On the contrary, when public policy 
encourages distrust or when social processes determine human relationships and 
wrongdoing is privileged, social capital will be zero. “The long history that we 
have investigated suggests that, to the extent that high-capacity states that make 
special use of capital and commitment as incentives for participation, the con-
tingent integration of trust networks into public policy will also persist” (Tilly, 
2010: p. 255). 
Contingent public policy, not legitimate to government actions, does not gen-
erate social capital, does not restore the relationship between trust-legitimacy- 
government, does not promote trust networks, does not generate institutions, 
does not create instituting value. In the opinion of Claue Lefort (1990), political 
and administrative efficiency cannot be reduced to legal institutions or mechan-
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isms that legitimize decision-making by the majority or the minority in govern-
ment. The idea and the democratic context of legitimacy presuppose and are le-
gitimized in the face of words such as respect for individuality, representation, 
institutions, political parties, participation, human rights, tolerance or sove-
reignty. The idea suggests the assumption that democratic, transparent, legiti-
mate or homogeneous institutions subordinate the individual to social cohesion. 
The search for political and administrative legitimacy, through the defense of 
national sovereignty, to maintain social harmony, a defense of individual rights 
and freedoms, remains inconclusive if it is not equivalent to the common inter-
est, that is, to political freedom. For Lefort (2007), the essence of the political is 
revealed in individual freedom and political freedom, by the individual and the 
citizen, by civil and civic values. The integrality of the argument is the ultimate 
foundation of legitimacy in a modern democracy. 
When human actions are constituted by experiences based on individual 
freedom and political freedom, a new adventure begins, a new way of feeling and 
knowing, certainties are nuanced, knowledge is put into question. The institu-
tionality of society is questioned by a law, by a power or in a State. A new idea 
arises, a new experience, new principles that transcend customs, traditions, the 
heterogeneity that accompany the domination of the individual by law, by so-
ciety, by the State, by all organizations that impose an instituted value. Legitima-
tion in a modern democracy is constituted as a process without beginning or 
end, the indeterminacy of legitimacy, is far from any empirical fact, from any 
quantification of the satisfaction of demands or the percentage of compliance 
with certain obligations. 
The determination of society, the society with history, the society with unique 
referents, the determination of empirical facts reduce democracy to totalitarian-
ism. The indeterminacy of power exalts individual freedom and political free-
dom, preserves the questioning of any single explanation of legitimation: in 
modern democracy legitimation is born in each act, it cannot be reduced to po-
litical, administrative, economic, cultural, social, or otherwise. For Claude Lefort 
(2007), legitimation is a symbolic mutation, a space that no one can occupy once 
or forever. Legitimization is a circumstance that is inaugurated with modern 
democracy, in the early nineteenth century, democracy more than a form of 
government is a form of society. According to Lefort, the great challenge of 
democratic society is the dissolution of certainties, the collapse of the indicators 
that determine the man with good or bad behavior. Democracy leads the indi-
vidual, encourages him, subjects him to the challenge of creating his own foun-
dations that recognize his own institution: in this case democracy. The founda-
tions of democracy present foundational features that make it indeterminable, 
uncertainty is inherent in all forms of democratic society. Democracy and its le-
gitimacy have a symbolic order, a political order, which is made and remade by 
individuals. 
No truth, no justification is immutable, since the origin of power will have to 
be thought about, because it no longer belongs to someone. Power belongs to 
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democratic society; power potentially belongs to everyone and cannot be perso-
nified by any subject or group (Maestre, 1994). Power is an empty place, it is 
unoccupied by a single person, it is a symbolic place that only occupies and con-
trols the vote. In the paradox of the argument, in the ultimate indeterminacy, in 
the dissolution of certainties, lies the foundation of power. On the contrary, 
when power takes shape, when the search for truth is replaced by truth, when 
the people are replaced by the prophet, when power becomes something partic-
ular at the service of a few, democracy is assumed as totalitarianism. 
Accountability, transparency, legitimacy, legality, will have to be rethought in 
their civic value, in their character and foundational nature of the constitution of 
political rights as human rights, that is, not as actions or government policies, 
even more as inherent to the form of society, as parts of a social question. In a 
democratic society, human rights appear linked to an integral conception of so-
ciety; they are not only individual rights, natural rights, social rights, citizen 
rights, constitutional rights or individual guarantees; they are rights that express 
the dignity of man, of political rights, that when questioned, the form of society 
is questioned. 
Lefort’s argument (2004) rejects the idea that human rights are reduced to in-
dividual rights, since the nature of the individual is constitutive of the form of 
society, the rights of man define and value the type of regime. The political 
meaning of the rights of man is what differentiates a totalitarian regime from a 
democratic one, since the political nature of democratic societies gives the gene-
rating responsibility of democracy to the rights of man. The rights of man are 
generators of democracy, because in them legal materialization is amalgamated, 
which regulates the behavior of individuals and affection, the adhesion that is 
provoked between men. The relationship between the institutionalization of law 
and men’s consciences is a problematic and complex relationship. It is a rela-
tionship that takes the form of a political regime. 
Colligating, at one point the questioning of the Welfare State, he acquired 
consensus on the inefficiency of bureaucracies, the lack of fulfillment of the ob-
jectives and as a consequence his estrangement from societies. The political and 
administrative efficiency of the Welfare State was placed in a legal framework. 
The defense of individual and social rights is what provides it with institutional 
legitimacy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
The perception of society integrated several different systems, whose limits, 
including the political and administrative system and its subsystems, are poorly 
valued, overlapped and sometimes diluted. The very fact that a social system in-
cludes inputs and outputs would emphasize the idea that it can be considered as 
an isolated unit since these processes derive in a broader analysis than they are 
located. This is especially true of the political system. 
6. Conclusion 
The legitimation of political and administrative processes is thought in terms of 
the contexts of modernity, that is, the encounter between the individual and the 
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State through political representation bodies. Without a doubt, the political par-
ties, organized as a government, are in charge of qualifying the government’s 
own actions. In this logic, politics and the way of doing it, responds to interests, 
which are alien to the individual. In order to evaluate certain actions as efficient 
or inefficient, in the modernity project, minimum criteria or common denomi-
nators are required that allow a positive or negative evaluation of government 
actions. Contrary to this, in our Latin American context, the measurement pa-
rameters are adopted from different realities. To a large extent, one starts from 
the assumption that political integration occurs through conflict, and it is for-
gotten that conflict itself and consensus are the basis and end of politics. 
Systems theory maintains a direct relationship with the perspectives of the 
new public management since it seeks to maintain a close relationship between 
problems and their solution. Governance in these approaches is based on the 
achievement of objectives, the fulfillment of results, customer satisfaction and 
the quantification of results. 
The public administration as an institution requires reviewing its incentive, 
punishment, encouragement or promotion tasks to encourage society and eco-
nomic agents in coordination and cooperation designs. Public administration is 
not only the organized activity of the State, but also the administration, conduct 
or directing of collective action that has its source in organized civil society. 
There are government efforts of increasing returns, however, society observes 
diminishing returns in the results since injustice, inequality, marginalization and 
poverty spread, the diversification of government or state policy is increasing 
and is no longer the main instrument of cohesion social in the strategic and in-
stitutional areas of the government. 
Today, more than ever we are witnessing a redefinition of what is public and 
its spaces of political and administrative efficiency, the process of transition or 
consolidation of democracy is the backbone of the invention of our democracy. 
One circumstance that adds to this process is the little or no possibility that in-
dividuals have to influence this reconfiguration of the public: it seems that the 
public is depoliticized and becomes a private space. A self-evaluation of the gov-
ernment processes is presented, without the individuals necessarily participating 
in the design of the evaluation instruments. The depoliticization of politics, 
through the privatization of social processes, is fortunate in our context. The se-
paration of power from society is manifested in that the actions, policies, pro-
grams, projects, of governments, political parties or institutions are not enough 
to legitimize them in a society made up of radically different individuals, who 
seek an integration and recognition, not only legal but social. 
Today, the government as an organization acquires the form of the State: the 
differentiation between the political regime, the political community and the po-
litical authority is diluted in everyday events; the roles of political authority 
overlap with the roles of extraction and administration. When governments are 
effective or ineffective, they are regularly blamed on external processes, cyclical 
economic crises, trade disadvantages, pressures, lawsuits, or international armed 
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problems. The internal problems are located in the lack of disposition or in the 
irresponsibility of the political parties represented in the congress to approve the 
state or constitutional reforms, in which the development of the country is 
placed. The persistence of anti-regime coalitions is the main element of legitima-
tion or delegitimization of the government. How to combine governmental ac-
tion (individual action) and integrative action (democratic) in the public admin-
istration, to find sources of political and administrative legitimacy for the State? 
According to Acemoglu & Robinson (2020), the answer is found in the effect of 
the Red Queen, the Chained Leviathan or the cage of norms. That is in limiting 
the elites’ control over the State and their domination over citizens, paradoxical-
ly it is necessary to increase the State’s capacity, but this is being achieved by ge-
nerating trust in society. The Chained Leviathan is the State with the force to 
fulfill property rights and contracts, but without the force to overcome them. 
Finally, the cage of norms suggests a crossroads between norms that emerge as 
an interpretation of shared justice and norms that found a despotic authority. 
Freedom and legitimacy can appear or disappear in the rules. 
There are certain consensuses that point towards governance as a form of 
public action. In legislative matters, while formalism prevails, laws cannot be 
considered as true political decisions, rather, they will be considered as a process 
of pseudo-regulatory elaboration. However, it must be recognized that one of the 
factors that aggravate legislative formalism comes from foreign pressure, pre-
cisely because international organizations and technical and financial assistance 
programs are oriented towards problems of economic development and public 
administration, rather than to the fundamental problem of political develop-
ment. International hubs often outline and promote the use of model structures 
to be used by developing countries. 
In this way, foreign influence weakens participation without ensuring the de-
sired practical effects. An example of what has been discussed is the administra-
tive reform programs or plans, in which, once the technical studies have been 
carried out, their conclusions are translated into laws and regulations and with 
significant frequency, their subsequent ineffectiveness is verified. This implies 
that the proposed changes have only rearranged the formal structures but have 
not seriously affected the underlying social and power structure, which is what 
determines, in fact, bureaucratic action. 
It is often argued that a Constitution provides the fundamental basis for effec-
tive public exercise. However, we can think of a more convincing inverse rela-
tionship, that is, that effective parliamentary activity gives validity and legitima-
cy to a Constitution. When a legislature is unable to make applicable decisions, 
public disappointment and apathy turn against the Constitution, as does the as-
sembly itself. When the Constitution itself reflects great social expectations, its 
legitimation requires increasing successes, since without them the system is dis-
credited, and popular consensus does not develop. 
A democratic political regime is legitimized by the constant and peaceful re-
newal of political power, through an electoral process that includes the electoral 
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participation of citizens; for its part, an authoritarian regime bases its credibility 
on the control and stability of the emerging and traditional groups of society. 
Public administration is an institution that does not form its legitimacy in elec-
toral processes, that is, in participation that becomes representation or in the 
possibility, which is allowed, to be monitored by social and political organiza-
tions, is legitimized by a job daily communication rationality, legitimation of 
their actions and the public value that it generates. In a context of political alter-
nation, public administration is part of the discourse of change, as an instrument 
of legitimation of the regime. Legitimation under these conditions is not derived 
from decisional efficiency. While in the immediate past, the public was identified 
with the state, today the existence of a non-state public space and different forms 
of coordination and agreement between the two has to be admitted. What is the 
particularity of these forms? How to enhance these forms? What requirements 
are posed to strengthen them and make them sustainable? These are some ques-
tions that will guide future studies. 
It is not only recognizing the diversity of actors, but also the expansion of 
public space. Today, the expressions of organized civil society are varied, which 
go on to play a fundamental role in the functioning of our society, the rights of 
man are defended and a minimum threshold is demanded that allows us to be 
recognized as citizens of the same community, a sense of belonging is promoted, 
new links are presented that allow the social fabric to be expanded. The notion 
of the social, which was first expressed in the political sphere as a social contract, 
is limited by the facts that are presented, now the defense of the social demands 
institutions with an instituting and instituted value that indicate us from where 
to judge what is right and what is wrong, what is admissible and what is inad-
missible, the just of the unjust in a society: common sense is what we have in 
common. The redefinition of deliberation approaches a social question. It will be 
necessary to continue revaluing political and administrative efficiency as institu-
tions, which have an instituting value in society, the value of the institutions is 
granted by the members of the community when they see it necessary, otherwise 
the organizations impose their value in a way instituted. 
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